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Language acquisition is always contextualized between a child and other persons. Even 
in the world according to MIT, where research driven by adult linguistic theory tends to be 
decontextualized and disembodied, no one believes that children learn language in a vacuum. At 
the most trivial level, children obviously have to experience a language in order to learn it. But 
in more psychologically driven theories, such as represented on this symposium panel, the 
social context carries considerably more weight and, as the title of the symposium indicates, is 
considered foundational. Appreciation for the social foundations of language emerged in the 
last generation along with the broader movement in psychology towards social explanations of 
behavior and development, inspired largely by the Russian-Cultural-Historical school. Most 
notably, Vygotsky (1962, 1978) stressed the importance of what a child first does only with 
guidance from other persons. The importance of interpersonal context and, in particular, 
Bruner's concept of scaffolding (1983; Ninio & Bruner, 1978), were readily appropriated for 
discourse-based theories of word learning and language acquisition more generally. 
Not surprisingly, the major emphasis in social theories of language development is on 
the part adults play in constructing and guiding the interpersonal context. Children are 
ordinarily taken into account to the extent they influence what a caregiver does. Bruner 
proposed that caregivers construct a supporting structure--a scaffold--by creating linguistic 
routines and formats that set up, frame, and guide interactions with young children. Learning 
language is thought to depend on these scaffolded interactions, and, in particular, on the leading 
role adults take in such formats. More recent concepts of interpersonal learning have 
acknowledged and also stressed that even though children are less knowledgeable and less 
competent, they have considerable influence on the adult in an interaction. Rogoff (1990, 1993), 
in particular, emphasized the active part children play in their own development, but she 
nevertheless portrayed the child as "guided" and "directed" by a more mature and capable 
partner. 
The goal of my contribution to this symposium, however, is to present a model of 
language development that shifts this balance of influence, from the adult to the child, for the 
social dynamics of their interaction. To be sure, the child is the novice--the child is the 
apprentice to the adult in language learning. But I suggest that fact cannot obscure the essential 
agency of the child, and the child's strong impetus to act, including acts of expression and 
interpretation. It is the child's agenda that creates the language-learning scenario, more often 
than not, and that sets the pace for language learning in everyday interactions. The 
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model builds on the young child's intentionality and the considerable contribution children 
make to their social interactions by expressing their intentional states. Intentional states are 
contents of mind under psychological attitudes of belief, desire, and feeling, as described, for 
example, in the philosophy of (Danto (1973, 1983), Searle (1983), and Taylor (1979, 1985), 
and Brentano (1930/1966) before them. They are dynamically constructed from moment-to-
moment in that part of the mind ordinarily referred to as consciousness (or working memory), 
and they are crucial to acquiring all forms of human behavior. Intentionality in this larger 
sense includes, but is not limited to, the narrow sense of goal-directed 'intentions to act' or 
'the intent to communicate' that are the focus of social, pragmatically based theories of 
language as a tool to get things done in the world. Language can influence the actions of other 
persons and get things done, but that can happen only because our words have the power to 
influence what others are thinking--their beliefs, feelings, and desires. 
In the model I've proposed (Bloom, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997), the driving force for 
language development comes from a child's strong impetus for expression and interpretation. 
Other persons and the social context are essential to the model, because children learn a 
language in order to make the private and hidden contents of mind public so they can be 
known and shared by other persons. Expression and interpretation are required for continuing 
and extending the intersubjectivity with others that has sustained the child's emotional and 
social life since infancy. And expression is required for achieving a sense of efficacy and 
control in interacting with the world. 
The intentionality model is consistent, therefore, with an extensive literature in 
developmental psychology documenting the powerful importance to development of the infant 
and young child's sense of control, efficacy, and agency in interacting with the world. Harter 
(1985) cited Cooley's (1902) observation that one's "self-feeling" is intimately connected to 
the exercise of power and sense of causal agency, with efforts beginning in early infancy to 
control movements of the limbs, objects in the immediate context, and the actions of other 
people. Acts of expression and interpretation promote feelings of control and efficacy, as 
children endeavor to create and negotiate the circumstances of their lives. In the intentionality 
model, social interaction for language acquisition is a matter of striving to share contents of 
mind rather than a matter of participating in formats, routines, and games in order to learn 
particular language forms. 
The intentionality model makes certain predictions about the structure of early 
spontaneous interactions and the kinds of contributions children and adults make to them. In 
particular, children would be expected to initiate more of their exchanges, and their mothers 
would be expected to respond more often to a child's opening turn than to take the first turn. 
Evidence from our recent studies of early conversations between mothers and children in the 
second year of life confirmed these predictions. We studied 12 children and their mothers 
longitudinally, seeing them every month from 9 months until they were over 2 years old. This 
was the period that encompassed the beginning of word learning, acquisition of early 
vocabulary, and their transition to phrases and simple sentences. On the basis of their growth 
in vocabulary from one month to the next, we identified two early reference points in their 
language development: first words and a vocabulary spurt. We then used these reference 
































From Bloom, Margulis, Tinker, & Fujita, 1996
Social Foundations, 6
Social Foundations, 7 
considerable part children play in establishing the focus in joint attention episodes, and the role 
mothers play in responding to a child's initiative, which is consistent with results of our 
studies of early conversation and play. Nevertheless, this pattern of child initiating and 
mother responding in episodes of shared attention was described as a scaffold by Tomasello 
(1988), even though it is the child's action that opens the structure of the exchange more often 
than not. He proposed that "joint attentional focus scaffolds the child into language." Going 
further, he suggested that the language learned in these exchanges "becomes one more device 
at the child's disposal for initiating and maintaining joint attention, and this, regardless o f  
whether it is supported linguistically or nonlinguistically, scaffolds still further language 
growth" (p. 75, emphasis added). 
One might ask whether joint attention that is initiated by the child, "regardless of 
whether it is supported linguistically or nonliguistically," is properly called 'scaffolding.' If 
mothers' setting up formats and routines is scaffolding, and then mothers' responding to a 
child's focus of attention is scaffolding, and, finally, children using the language learned in 
these exchanges in their further efforts to establish joint attention is also scaffolding--in short, 
if everything is scaffolding--then it is not clear just what the theory of scaffolding explains. In 
any event, scaffolds have their counterparts in bootstraps--both are external devices and 
inherently mechanistic. Still missing is the internal component, the child's contents of mind 
that kindle and fuel the interaction to begin with. So far, the significance of joint focus of 
attention on objects and actions has been attributed to the opportunity it creates for learning the 
names of the objects and actions--the traditional notion of reference and word-to-world 
mapping. But when one considers that the word names the mental element--not the object in 
the world--the emphasis shifts from the relationship between word and object, to the 
representation the child has in mind that mediates the relationship between them --a mind-to-
world mapping (see Figure 5). 
In short, accounts of joint attentional focus and scaffolding have so far overlooked the 
mental objects in intentional states that language articulates, in an act of expression, and that 
language sets up, in an act of interpretation. It is the elements in these representations in 
consciousness that refer to objects and events in the world. When a child looks at the clock on 
the wall and says "ticktock," the act of reference depends on an element in mind and the 
child's psychological attitude toward it. It is the elements in intentional states, what 
Fauconnier called "mental spaces," that are directed at objects in the world and that refer to 
those objects (1985, p.2). Children learn the words that name the mental elements, and adults 
are responsible for providing the words that connect a child's mind to the social and physical 
world. Shifting the emphasis in interactions to the internal, mental component changes the 
dynamics of joint attention and the nature of social cognition for language development. 
The essential thesis of the intentionality model is that development depends on a 
process of transaction between internal representations in intentional states and the external 
social and physical world. This process is governed by several generalizations I have called 
the principles of relevance, discrepancy, and elaboration (Bloom, 1993). According to the 
principle of relevance, development is enhanced when events in the context bear upon and are 
pertinent to what the child has in mind. The relevance of adult behavior is assured when 
In the INTENTIONALITY MODEL ...
--
The child's intentional state is what the child has in 
mind at any moment in time: representations of 
objects, roles, and relationships. Words mediate 
mind/world transactions, going from mind to world for 
EXPRESSION --the words a child says articulate what 
the child has in mind, and from world to mind for 
INTERPRETATION --the words a child hears change 
what the child has in mind to set up new 
representations. 
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adults take what the child has in mind into account for their own behavior. Relevance, 
therefore, is the foundation for a shared focus of attention. Cues to relevance are in the 
ostensive signals that pass between child and caregiver--a glance, a gaze, a point, a smile, a 
frown, and the like--and, according to Sperber and Wilson (1986), relevance is guaranteed by 
such ostensive communication. Tomasello (1988; & Akhtar, 1995) and Baldwin (1993a,b), in 
particular, have shown how ostensive signals in the context of joint attention influence what 
the child has in mind, by providing cues to what is relevant in the context for learning the 
meanings of words --thereby making appeals to word learning constraints, biases, or lexical 
principles unnecessary. 
According to the principle of discrepancy, development is enhanced when the child acts 
to resolve a mismatch between contents of mind and things already evident in the context. As 
infants remember past events and anticipate new events, their contents of mind differ from 
what is perceptible to others. They have beliefs, desires, and feelings about things which are 
not yet known to other persons in the here-and-now. Children will have to acquire a language, 
because what they have in mind must be expressed if it is to be known and shared by others 
who cannot exploit clues from the context for understanding. Thus, development from first 
words to a vocabulary spurt in the 2nd year is not simply learning more words. The children 
we studied learned more words but, consistent with the principle of discrepancy, they learned 
more words to talk about things they anticipated--desires that were imminent, and not yet 
already evident to other persons in the situation (Bloom, 1994; Bloom, Beckwith, Capatides, & 
Hafitz, 1988). 
And finally, according to the principle of elaboration, children will have to learn more 
words and, eventually, procedures for sentences, if they are to express and articulate the 
increasingly elaborated contents of mind made possible by other developments in cognition and 
social and emotional understanding. Consistent with the principle of elaboration, the children 
we studied also talked more about anticipated actions relative to state events. Actions are more 
elaborated, than simple states, having more elements, roles, and relations between them. 
To conclude, language learning depends on the mind of the young child and its 
development. What then is the role of intentionality for the social foundations of language 
development? A child's intentionality has at least these three influences on the social 
dynamics of language learning. First, other persons and the social context are essential, 
because the motivation for learning a language, in the first place, is to express and interpret 
intentional states, and thereby sustain and promote intersubjectivity with other persons beyond 
i n fancy. Second, as intentional states become increasingly elaborated and discrepant from 
what can be known and shared between the child and other persons, more of the language will 
have to be learned if child and other are to 'keep in touch' with what each is thinking and 
feeling. Language not only expresses, it also articulates the abstract and intricate elements, 
roles, and relationships in intentional states made possible by development. And third, because 
children's expressions--their affect, actions, and, eventually, speech--embody their intentional 
states and make them manifest and public, caregivers and others can respond to 
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them, and thereby promote the child's efficacy and assure the child's participation in a social 
world. 
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